A considerable literature exists regarding the moral obligation to keep one's promises. Several authors have focused on the exceptional circumstances which may or should excuse this moral duty. Less frequently discussed is the question of how this general moral obligation and its possible exceptions play out in the context of negotiable written promises to pay money, i.e., so-called "commercial paper." This paper focuses on the application of the legal rules governing commercial paper, and on the ethical implications involved in the (...) application of those rules. More specifically, it asks whether the assertion of the technical doctrine known as "holder in due course," and the denial of that status in some cases, promotes ethical behavior in the marketplace. By examining the circumstances of one case, involving a substantial investment and a large bank, I hope to shed some light on how the legal and ethical rules do in fact "intersect.". (shrink)

A considerable literature exists regard-ing the moral obligation to keep one's promises. Several authors have focused on the exceptional circumstances which may or should excuse this moral duty. Less frequently discussed is the question of how this general moral obligation and its possible exceptions play out in the context of negotiable written promises to pay money, i.e., so-called "commercial paper."This paper focuses on the application of the legal rules governing commercial paper, and on the ethical implications involved in the application (...) of those rules. More specifically, it asks whether the assertion of the technical doctrine known as "holder in due course," and the denial of that status in some cases, promotes ethical behavior in the marketplace. By examining the circumstances of one case, involving a substantial investment and a large bank, I hope to shed some light on how the legal and ethical rules do in fact "intersect.". (shrink)

Lawyers and the legal system have been much criticized in recent years. Despite popular perceptions, the legal system contains numerous mechanisms and rules designed to ensure fair results. This paper shows how the legal system tries to implement, in commercial transactions, the ethical principles of truthfulness and fairness. The Anglo-American development of Equity Courts is reviewed briefly. Several examples of the Law's enforcement of ethical principles are presented, in four different legal areas: Contracts, Securities, Goods, and Real Estate. The intent (...) here is to present an overview of the problem, with area-specific illustrations, rather than a comprehenisve examination of the cases in just one area. (shrink)

We present a one per cent measurement of the cosmic distance scale from the detections of the baryon acoustic oscillations in the clustering of galaxies from the Baryon Oscillation Spectroscopic Survey, which is part of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey III. Our results come from the Data Release 11 sample, containing nearly one million galaxies and covering approximately 8500 square degrees and the redshift range 0.2 < z < 0.7. We also compare these results with those from the publicly released (...) DR9 and DR10 samples. Assuming a concordance Λ cold dark matter cosmological model, the DR11 sample covers a volume of 13 Gpc3 and is the largest region of the Universe ever surveyed at this density. We measure the correlation function and power spectrum, including density-field reconstruction of the BAO feature. The acoustic features are detected at a significance of over 7σ in both the correlation function and power spectrum. Fitting for the position of the acoustic features measures the distance relative to the sound horizon at the drag epoch, rd, which has a value of rd,fid = 149.28 Mpc in our fiducial cosmology. We find DV = at z = 0.32 and DV = at z = 0.57. At 1.0 per cent, this latter measure is the most precise distance constraint ever obtained from a galaxy survey. Separating the clustering along and transverse to the line of sight yields measurements at z = 0.57 of DA = and H =. Our measurements of the distance scale are in good agreement with previous BAO measurements and with the predictions from cosmic microwave background data for a spatially flat CDM model with a cosmological constant. © 2014 The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society. (shrink)

The latest volume of the Antinoopolis Papyri contains fragments of some 40 iambic lines in praise of a certain Archelas. The papyrus is dated by J. W. B. Barns, the editor of the piece, to the sixth century A.D., and the poem itself can be no older, since corrections and alterations show it to be an author's draft. According to Barns it is ‘an iambic encomium of a type not uncommon in late Greek occasional poetry from Egypt’. I would suggest (...) rather that the surviving lines come in fact from an iambic preface to a hexameter encomium.In the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries it was standard, if not universal, practice to preface a hexameter poem with an iambic prologue. Since details are not readily available, and are relevant to my argument, I tabulate them here. First the four examples that have come to us by manuscript tradition, as it happens the same manuscript, and all dating from the second half of the sixth century. (shrink)

Propertivs IV. iii. 7 sqq.: 7 Te modo uiderunt iteratos Bactra per ortus, te modo munito Neuricus hostis equo, hibernique Getae, pictoque Britannia curru, 10 ustus et Eoa discolor Indus aqua. 8 munito Beroaldus, munitus O., Neuricus Jacob, hericus NFL, hernicus D. 10 ustus MSS., uastus Palmer, pastus Otto, tunsus Housman, discolor MSS., decolor Passerat.

Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9. Consciousness: Owen Flanagan. 10. Decision Making: J. Frank (...) Yates and Paul A. Estin. 11. Emotions: Paul E. Griffiths. 12. Imagery and Spatial Representation: Rita E. Anderson. 13. Language Evolution and Neuromechanisms: Terrence W. Deacon. 14. Language Processing: Kathryn Bock and Susan M. Garnsey. 15. Linguistics Theory: D. Terence Langendoen. 16. Machine Learning: Paul Thagard. 17. Memory: Henry L. Roediger III and Lyn M. Goff. 18. Perception: Cees Van Leeuwen. 19. Perception: Color: Austen Clark. 20. Problem Solving: Kevin Dunbar. 21. Reasoning: Lance J. Rips. 22. Social Cognition: Alan J. Lambert and Alison L. Chasteen. 23. Unconscious Intelligence: Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber. 24. Understanding Texts: Art Graesser and Pam Tipping. 25. Word Meaning: Barbara C. Malt. Part III: Methodologies of Cognitive Science:. 26. Artificial Intelligence: Ron Sun. 27. Behavioral Experimentation: Alexander Pollatsek and Keith Rayner. 28. Cognitive Ethology: Marc Bekoff. 29. Deficits and Pathologies: Christopher D. Frith. 30. Ethnomethodology: Barry Saferstein. 31. Functional Analysis: Brian Macwhinney. 32. Neuroimaging: Randy L. Buckner and Steven E. Petersen. 33. Protocal Analysis: K. Anders Ericsson. 34. Single Neuron Electrophysiology: B. E. Stein, M.T. Wallace, and T.R. Stanford. 35. Structural Analysis: Robert Frank. Part IV: Stances in Cognitive Science:. 36. Case-based Reasoning: David B. Leake. 37. Cognitive Linguistics: Michael Tomasello. 38. Connectionism, Artificial Life, and Dynamical Systems: Jeffrey L. Elman. 39. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition: Andy Clark. 40. Mediated Action: James V. Wertsch. 41. Neurobiological Modeling: P. Read Montague and Peter Dayan. 42. Production Systems: Christian D. Schunn and David Klahr. Part V: Controversies in Cognitive Science:. 43. The Binding Problem: Valerie Gray Hardcastle. 44. Heuristics and Satisficing: Robert C. Richardson. 45. Innate Knowledge: Barbara Landau. 46. Innateness and Emergentism: Elizabeth Bates, Jeffrey L. Elman, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett. 47. Intentionality: Gilbert Harman. 48. Levels of Explanation and Cognition Architectures: Robert N. McCauley. 49. Modularity: Irene Appelbaum. 50. Representation and Computation: Robert S. Stufflebeam. 51. Representations: Dorrit Billman. 52. Rules: Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 53. Stage Theories Refuted: Donald G. Mackay. Part VI: Cognitive Science in the Real World:. 54. Education: John T. Bruer. 55. Ethics: Mark L. Johnson. 56. Everyday Life Environments: Alex Kirlik. 57. Institutions and Economics: Douglass C. North. 58. Legal Reasoning: Edwina L. Rissland. 59. Mental Retardation: Norman W. Bray, Kevin D. Reilly, Lisa F. Huffman, Lisa A. Grupe, Mark F. Villa, Kathryn L. Fletcher, and Vivek Anumolu. 60. Science: William F. Brewer and Punyashloke Mishra. Selective Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science: William Bechtel and Tadeusz Zawidzki. (shrink)

Lorsqu'il aborde les vérités de mathématiques dans la «I re Méditation», Descartes ne dit pas si la perception qu'il en a est claire et distincte ou non. Certains, dont H. G. Frankfurt, persuadés que Descartes tient pour impossible la révocation en doute du clair et distinct, estiment que cette perception est nécessairement obscure et confuse. S'appuyant sur divers textes, Frankfurt verrait d'ailleurs en lui à ce moment-là un empiriste naïf. Nous tentons ici l'hypothèse contraire en attribuant le silence de Descartes (...) aux contraintes que l'ordre des raisons impose au langage même dont il se sert: en effet, clarté et distinction sont pour Descartes des termes techniques dont il ne peut s'autoriser l'emploi qu'à partir de la «III e Méditation». Cette perception serait donc, selon nous, matériellement claire et distincte; elle serait néanmoins révoquée en doute, sans quoi la validation de la raison que tente Descartes ne saurait s'accomplir. (shrink)

La preuve ontologique fait plus qu'appuyer celles de la IIIe Méditation. Elle vise à répondre enfin à ceux « qui aimeront mieux nier l'existence d'un Dieu si puissant, que de croire que toutes les autres choses sont incertaines », donc à des mathématiciens athées, reprenant ainsi, pour l'éliminer, une des alternatives déployées à la Ie Méditation. Dieu, condition suffisante de la connaissance (Méditations III & IV), en devient la condition nécessaire aussi (Méditation V). Cette preuve permet donc à Descartes de (...) parer à la possibilité d'un rationalisme – cartésien certes – mais athée. Nous concluons en faisant le point sur le débat qui opposa MM. Gueroult et Gouhier, sur ce sujet, vers 1958. The ontological proof does more than corroborate those of Meditation III. It seeks to answer at last those « who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God, rather than to believe that everything else is uncertain » (atheistic mathematicians), thus taking up again, in order to rule it out, one of the alternatives presented in Meditation I. God, the sufficient condition of knowledge (Meditations III & IV), now becomes its necessary condition as well (Meditation V). This proof thus enables Descartes to forestall the possibility of an atheistic, even though Cartesian, rationalism. We conclude with an assessment of the debate which opposed Messrs. Gueroult and Gouhier, on this topic, around 1958. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Bibliography on Plato's "'Laws, "" 1920-1970: With Additional Citations through May, 1975. By Trevor J. Saunders. (New York: Arno Press, 1976. Pp. i + 60. $15.00) The Penguin Classics translator of the non-Socratic Laws, as Leo Strauss called them, has here compiled in a most usable way a thorough bibliography of books and articles about the Laws or parts of them. The section "Texts, Translations, and Commentaries" (...) properly excludes translations not made directly from the Greek. In previous centuries this would, also properly, have excluded many a famous or popular translation, such as Thomas Taylor's or Victor Cousin's, worked out from the text of M. Ficino's "first edition" in Latin. Given the state of the Greek text and the practice, inaugurated by Ficino, of improving upon the Greek in the translatioias, some notation about the literalness of the translations cited would have been of additional value. Section B, in thirty pages, is the largest and also deliberately the most selective in striving to limit itself to work concerned exclusively or primarily with the Laws. But it cannot avoid including much material about some aspect of Plato in general rather than about the Laws; this is especially true of the subsection, B1, on comprehensive accounts. Section B2, on the text and its tradition, has overwhelmingly more citations about the indirect tradition than about the texts themselves, an interesting indication of the current state of this question. The next subsections, to B12, divide according to subject matter. BI3 lists studies on the influence of the Laws. The last section, in twenty-four pages, is most valuable. It lists, by Stephanus page number, an abundance of discussions of individual passages from Book I through Book XII wherever these discussions, bibliographically speaking, may have occurred. Students of the Laws will be well served by, and most grateful to, Professor Saunders for this bibliography. I can only second the intent of his parting epigraph that sends us back to the study of the Laws themselves. But I must add that more explicitly detailed work appears to be required both on the difficulties the text itself presents to students of Plato (one thinks of A. Boeckh's analyses of the prose in Books I through III) and on those which arise when the Laws is contrasted--from the point of view of design and intellectuality--with those of Plato's works that are comparable, if not in number of pages, at least in scale of conception and monumentality. V. TEJERA SUNY at Stony Brook Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's Biological Works. By Anthony Preus. (Hildesheim and New York: George Olms, 1975. Pp. ix + 404. DM.88) A reciprocal influence between Aristotle's philosophy and biology--if it could be demonstrated through step-by-step criticism and not merely asserted in generalities about functionalism--might help to explain both, and might also itself be philosophically interesting ; for it should clarify Aristotle's concepts of form, essence, universal, and species-concepts which have been mercilessly jumbled in the traditional interpretations. With the failure of Jaegerian developmental analyses, we can hardly now hope for help from detailed chronology. But a general dating of Aristotle's biological interest to the Assos-Mytilene period, when he was already aged forty, is accepted by most people (though not by Jaeger who [463] 464 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY put it at the end, nor by Ryle who put it at the beginning of Aristotle's career) and is the basis of Anthony Preus's contention in this book. For if Aristotle began serious biology only in middle life we could expect a tension between the antiphenomenal metaphysics of the Academy, which he had just left after twenty years there, and the kind of philosophizing and explaining that might seem demanded by living concrete organisms. Preus sets out to show such a tension, claiming on page 1 that "in P. A. and G. A. sometimes the philosophical position is bent to fit the observed facts, and sometimes the observations are adjusted to fit the philosophical position." The reader may be assured at once that this appalling accusation (which is repeated in the publisher's blurb) is not... (shrink)

2e Partie: La Religion Determinee 2: Les Religions De L'individualite Spirituelle Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Le spectacle présenté aux Romains est la preuve de cette tuerie stupide, particulièrement l'histoire d'une mort froide, d'un ...

An Introduction to Business Ethics explores the issues of individual and corporate responsibility in business, and integrates many contemporary and classic ...

InhaltVorwortSiglenverzeichnisJürgen STOLZENBERG: Fichtes Deduktionen des Ich 1804 und 1794Ulrich SCHLÖSSER: Worum geht es in der späteren Wissenschaftslehre und inwiefern unterscheiden sich die verschiedenen Darstellungen von ihr dem Ansatz nach?Enrico GIORGIO: Der Begriff »absolutes Wissen« in der WL-1801/02 aus der Perspektive der SpätlehreFaustino FABBIANELLI: Ist die späte Wissenschaftslehre ein »Aktualer Idealismus«? Ein spekulativer Vergleich zwischen Fichtes und Gentiles DenkenVadim V. MURSKIY: Fichtes Spätwerk in Bezug auf das Problem der Einheit und der Veränderung seiner LehreJohannes BRACHTENDORF: Substanz, Subjekt, Sein – die Spinoza-Rezeption (...) der frühen und der späten WissenschaftslehreBirgit SANDKAULEN: Spinoza zur Einführung. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1812Ewa NOWAK-JUCHACZ: Philosophie als vox pacis. J. G. Fichtes Pragmatik als Gegenstück des regulativen Friedensideals I. KantsVladimir ALEKSEEVIC ABASCHNIK: Die ersten Fichteaner über die Schwierigkeiten des Verständnisses der WissenschaftslehreMarina PUSCHKAREWA: Fichte und Schelling. Das Problem des »Trägers des Wissens«Robert MARSZAŁEK: Fichtes Religionstheorie im Licht der Schellingschen Gedanken zur MythologieSalvatore PATRIARCA: Gesetz und Selbstbestimmung des Absoluten. Ein Vergleich zwischen der späten Philosophie Fichtes und der mittleren Philosophie SchellingsPaul ZICHE: Systemgrundriß und blitzartige Einsichten. Zum Verhältnis von Propädeutik und systematischer Philosophie bei Fichte und SchellingGiacomo RINALDI: Method and Speculation in Fichte’s Later PhilosophyAngelica NUZZO: Fichte’s 1812 Transcendental Logic – Between Kant and HegelDiogo FERRER: Hegels Fichte-Kritik und die späte WissenschaftslehreRolf AHLERS: Der späte Fichte und Hegel über das Absolute und SystematizitätMatteo Vincenzo D’ALFONSO: Schopenhauer als Schüler FichtesXabier Insausti UGARRIZA: José Manzanas Rezeption des späten FichteIbon Uribarri ZENEKORTA: Manzana zwischen Kant und Fichte. Das Absolute als entscheidende FrageHiroshi KIMURA: Fichte und Tekirei Edo – Bild und Feld. (shrink)

Georges Le Rider, Les deux monnaies macédoniennes des années 323-294/290 p. 491-500 Après la mort d'Alexandre en 323, deux monnaies furent émises parallèlement en Macédoine jusqu'en 294-290 : des alexandres et des philippes en or et en argent. On a expliqué ce double monnayage par des raisons commerciales (les peuples des Balkans auraient été très attachés aux philippes) ou par des raisons politiques (propagande en faveur de Philippe III). Dans cet article, l'accent est mis sur une explication de caractère fiscal. (...) Pour recueillir des revenus procurés normalement par la frappe d'un monnayage local, les autorités macédoniennes auraient émis des philippes (monnaie macédonienne par excellence, d'usage interne) parallèlement aux alexandres (monnaie internationale, réservée aux relations avec l'extérieur). (shrink)

Présentation de deux octadrachmes d'or, qui montrent au droit les portraits géminés d'un tout jeune roi, Antiochos, et d'une reine, dont l'effigie est placée au premier plan. On peut considérer que ce jeune Antiochos est un fils de Séleucos IV, qui disparut le 3 septembre 175, victime d'Héliodore. Après un règne de quelques semaines, il fut peut-être adopté et nommé co-régent par Antiochos IV, puis mis à mort par ce dernier en 170. La reine représentée sur les deux octadrachmes ne (...) peut être que la mère du jeune souverain, Laodice, qu'on peut identifier comme la fille d'Antiochos III et la femme d'Antiochos l'aîné, de Séleucos IV et d'Antiochos IV, ses frères. Commentaire des deux portraits géminés et réflexions sur le monnayage relativement abondant du jeune Antiochos. (shrink)

II est proposé d'attribuer à Antiochos II et à l'atelier de Mylasa l'émission monétaire WSM 1468, qui avait été classée par E.T. Newell à Antiochos III et à l'atelier de Bargylia. Une indication chronologique est donnée par le trésor de Hija e Korbit, récemment découvert en Albanie. Quant au symbole d'Artémis Kindyas, qui avait entraîné l'attribution à Bargylia, les alexandres où il apparaît semblent être originaires de Mylasa.

Dans les traités conclus avec les Étoliens en 189 et avec Antiochos III en 188, les Romains exigent d'être payés en monnaies d'argent d'aussi bonne qualité que la monnaie d'Athènes, universellement connue. La quantité de métal monnayé est également précisée, dans le premier traité en talents euboïques, dans le second en talents de 80 livres romaines, qui sont des unités équivalentes. Les Romains réclament expressément d'être payés, pour tout ou du moins une large part de l'indemnité, non en monnaies d'or (...) mais en monnaies d'argent, car ce sont elles qui constituaient le moyen habituel des échanges. La ratio or/argent prescrite est de 1 : 10, respectant le taux courant à l'époque dans cette partie du monde grec. (shrink)

Les émissions monétaires en argent des Séleucides en Coelé Syrie et en Phénicie, après la conquête de la province en 200, ne manquent pas de surprendre. Antiochos III n'y frappa pas de monnaies en ce métal. Ses premiers successeurs ouvrirent un atelier à Antioche-Aké-Ptolémaïs, mais les tétradrachmes de poids attique, aux types séleucides habituels, qu'ils y produisirent ne circulèrent pas dans la province, comme en témoignent les trésors. Pendant la lre moitié du 11e siècle, le numéraire lagide continua d'être utilisé. (...) À partir de 150, Alexandre Bala et les rois suivants frappèrent dans plusieurs ateliers un monnayage d'aspect inattendu : des espèces au portrait et au nom du roi séleucide, mais de poids lagide et montrant au revers l'aigle ptolémaïque sur un foudre. Cette étude cherche à expliquer les raisons d'un tel comportement, qui eut pour effet de laisser monétairement la Coelé Syrie et la Phénicie à l'écart des autres provinces du royaume. (shrink)

Some recent discussions of corporate loyalty have found it misguided, while others see it as crucial for financial success. Thereis also disagreement over the nature of loyalty. This article analyzes the concept of loyalty, arguing that it is neither a duty nor a virtue(although it has overlaps with those categories), but a passion related to various virtues (and vices). Contrary to standard accounts ofcapitalism, loyalty does not necessarily oppose self-interest. Furthermore, corporations can and should be communities, andinsofar as they are, (...) they are proper objects for loyalty. If corporations are not communities, then loyalty to them cannot exist. (shrink)

This paper explores how whiteness as the transcendental norm shapes the meaning structure of Black-being-in-the-world. If home is a place, a site, a dwelling of acceptance, where one is allowed to feel safe, to relax, to let one’s guard down, then being Black in white supremacist America is anathema to being at home for Black people. Indeed, to be Black is to be a stranger, something “strange,” “scary,” “dangerous,” an “outsider.” To be Black within white America belies what it means (...) to dwell, to reside, to rest. In other words, one’s sense of racialized Black embodiment remains on guard, unsettled, hyperalert. Phenomenologically, there is a profound sense of alienation, where one’s racialized body is ostracized and shunned. On this score, I examine, within the mundane context of an elevator, how the dynamics of intersubjectivity and sociality are strained through the dynamics of the white gaze. The white gaze, among other things, functions to police the meaning of the Black body and attempts to de-subjectify Black embodiment. In this way, the only real perspective is white. Black bodies are deemed devoid of a perspective on the world as there is no subjectivity, no sense of agential meaning making. One might say that Black people, on this view, constitute an essence, a typified mode of being. Unlike the existentialist thesis where existence precedes essence, Black people are locked into an objecthood, a fungible and fixed essence. This racial and racist myth is what, for Schutz, would collapse the importance that he places on intersubjectivity and sociality. Indeed, within this paper, I delineate the threatening, necro-political dimensions of whiteness that I experienced after writing the well-known article “Dear White America.” That experience cemented, for me, and for many other readers, what it means to occupy the residence of whiteness, an abode that can take one’s life in the blink of an eye. The experience of the racialized stranger means walking a tightrope, a precarious situation where one flirts with death, where one’s body is deemed hypersexual, inferior, frightening, and monstrous. Based upon this construction, the white body is deemed the site of virtue, safety, deliverer, protector of all things white and pure. Think here of “the white man’s burden” or the idea of “white manifest destiny.” Stain, blemish, taint, and defilement are indelible markers of the stranger. And based upon the logics of racial purity, one must extinguish the “vermin,” the “criminals,” the “rapists.” While I don’t explore this within the paper, Schutz scholars will immediately recognize the genocidal implications of what would have been at stake for Schutz had he not escaped Adolf Hitler’s anti-Semitic gaze and his Anschluss of Austria. My sense is that Schutz would have understood not just the horrors of white racism but would appreciate the necessity of theorizing the need to rethink home as existentially capacious and intersubjectively vibrant. I conclude this paper by thinking through the concept of “breakdown”, delineating its spatial, phenomenological, and subjectively embodied implications. Breakdown, as I use the term, upends forms of white racialized habituation, creating possible embodied psychic space for what I term un-suturing, which involves undoing the machinations of white safety in the face of alterity, where the stranger invokes wonder and self-critique. (shrink)

For fifty years, Willard Van Orman Quine's books and articles have stimulated intense debate in the fields of logic and the philosophy of language. Many scholars in fact, regard Quine as the greatest living English-speaking philosopher; yet his views remain widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. This book provides the first major explication and defense of Quine's systematic philosophy and is ideally suited for use as a required or supplementary text in a wide variety of undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy and (...) linguistics.The book explores the far-reaching implications of Quine's views on language for contemporary analytic philosophy. It is unique in providing a lucid and rich description and reconstruction of the historical context from which Quine's work grew, focusing in particular on the role that Russell and Wittgenstein played in shaping the problems inherited by Quine. It presents Quine's difficult later views in an accessible fashion, bringing out as no other study has the very radical nature of his position. One of the book's highlights is its careful examination and assessment of Tarski's theory of truth as it relates to the traditions of Russell and Wittgenstein and to Quine's own philosophy.George D. Romanos took his Ph.D. in philosophy under George D. W. Berry and Paul T. Sagal at Boston University. This book grew out of his dissertation with the active criticism and support of Quine himself. (shrink)